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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

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SUBJECT: Comments on African Research Paper

In connection with the Department's contribution to the revision of the 1953 National Intelligence Estimate on Tropical Africa, the Embassy submits the following comments. These center on Africa: A Special Assessment (OIR Report 7103, January 3, 1956), which from the viewpoint of United Kingdom attitudes toward African developments the Embassy considers a well-balanced and very helpful report, rather than the older paper, Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa (OIR Report No. 6390, August 24, 1953). Pages cited below refer to the document.

Growth and Consequences of African Nationalism

Review of the document CIA has determined that

☐ CIA has no objection to declass

☒ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S

Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 21 JULY 81 Review 11 018557

1. It would seem advisable to qualify the statement on page 11 that the Gold Coast will attain full independence in 1957. The Colonial Office has shown rising concern about developments in Ashanti and anxiety that Her Majesty's Government would be caught between Nkrumah's demand for independence at that date and voices in the United Kingdom insisting that traditional and regional elements in the Gold Coast require additional safeguards against the possibility of a C.P.P. dictatorship. Also before independence occurs it would appear that a solution on British Togoland should be reached, and Commonwealth members would probably have to discuss Gold Coast membership.

2. Despite the great success of the Queen's tour in Nigeria, there seems less confidence here than two years ago about harmonious political development. There is no assurance that the Northern Region will follow the Eastern and Western Regions in asking for self-government (page 11). With self-government for a region the question of making suitable arrangements for the retention of needed British senior civil servants becomes more acute. On this point there has been some unofficial talk here of organizing a Commonwealth civil service from which territories such as the Nigerian regions could draw.

3. The East African territories seem to have made considerable

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political progress over the last year. The Colonial Office is pleased with developments in Kenya under the Lyttelton Proposals, and the Labor Party has largely ceased to attack the Government for its handling of the Emergency. The atmosphere in which the Coutts Report was discussed seems a considerable improvement over earlier talks about the suffrage. The Mau Mau menace, however, is far from over. African nationalism seems at its liveliest in Uganda. In the British view the territory needs considerable experience under the 1954 constitutional arrangements before progress can be made on the lines demanded by the National Congress party. Though nationalist forces in Tanganyika seem far weaker than in the other East African territories, agitation for more rapid political development seems to be increasing there.

Outlook for Increased Racial Tension

1. Official and unofficial observers here are most pessimistic about the racial situation in the Union whose ties with the Commonwealth are seen to be weakening.
2. United Kingdom opinion remains firmly united in the resolve that the High Commission territories should not be handed over to the Union without their consent and so long as transfer would involve a right-about-face in the treatment of Africans in the territories.
3. A current of uneasiness remains here regarding racial relations in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. While officials are most hesitant about speaking on this subject, the impression is that the Federation should take more significant steps to convince the Africans that federation will satisfy their aspirations than has been the case up to now. So far as the United Kingdom Government is concerned, the hope seems to be that the Federation will serve as a bulwark against the spread of South African segregation policies to British territories north of the Union.

Soviet Intentions

On the basis of Soviet maneuvers in Libya, Khartoum and, more recently, Liberia, presumably the new NIE paper will have more to say on this aspect than the earlier paper. As evidenced by their reaction to the Soviet proposal to send diplomatic representatives to Liberia, British officials are fully aware of the dangers involved in an expansion of Soviet activities in British territories and are very much concerned. In certain quarters of the British Government the view has been expressed that a joint United States-United Kingdom policy should be concerted on the means by which this danger should be met. A Soviet offer of economic assistance, especially to areas which are having difficulty financing their development programs, such as Kenya,

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or to territories where settlers play little part (e.g. the Gold Coast and Nigeria) is not a far-fetched possibility. Hence it seems advisable to indicate a stronger possibility of a step-up in Soviet activities in the area than is shown on page 26.

Social and Economic Changes

It would be helpful if some statistical or graphical means could be found to indicate how meagre are the financial resources of almost all African territories to tackle the enormous economic and social problems facing them at a pace commensurate with African expectations. In this connection a breakdown of the American aid figure on page 35 would serve to show that two or three countries have received a very large percentage of this money.

For the Ambassador:

Peter Rutter

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